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ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE: ISSUE-RELATED
WAIVERS
ELIZABETH G. THORNBURG*

IN RECENT YEARS, legislatures, courts and commentators have debated the parameters of the attorney-client
privilege.' The result of this debate is a close examination and refinement of the uses of the privilege. What
has remained largely unnoticed, however, is a growing
body of case law finding a waiver of attorney-client privilege in the context of litigation.2 Lawyers who are unaware of these cases may inadvertently jeopardize their
clients' privileged materials.
Courts have long held that the privilege is waived when
the client attacks the attorney's advice. Taking this one
step further, cases have held that the attorney-client privi-

lege is waived when a party to litigation explicitly relies on
an attorney's advice.4 Many litigants are unaware, however, that this principle can apply even when they do not
mention the attorney-client communication itself. An increasing number of courts have held that whenever a
* Director of Legal Writing, Southern Methodist University. B.A., College of
William & Mary, 1976; J.D., Southern Methodist University, 1979. Ms. Thornburg is a former Senior Notes and Comments Editor of the Journal.
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.502 (West 1976); Upjohn Co. v. United States,
449 U.S. 383 (1981); Diversified Indust., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir.
1978) (en banc); Hellerstein, Current Problems about the Attorney-Client Privilege, ALTABA COURSE OF STUDY 119 (1980); Kaminsky, State Evidentiay Privileges in Federal
Civil Litigation, 43 FORDHAm L. REV. 923 (1975); Comment, The Lawyer-Client Privilege, 56 Nw. U. L. REV. 235 (1961).
2 See infra notes 33-54 and accompanying text.
3 See Hunter v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464 (1888). See also infra notes 11-21 and
accompanying text.
4 See infra notes 22-31 and accompanying text.
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party raises an issue that makes the privileged communication relevant, the privilege is waived. 5
All of these forms of waiver are based on notions of
fairness. Wigmore stated that in considering waiver issues "regard must be had to . . .the element of fairness
and consistency. "6 Courts often echo this principle. In
Kelly v. Cummens7 the court held:
[A] client who goes upon the stand in an attempt to secure
some advantage by reason of transactions between himself
and his counsel waives his right to object to the attorney's
being called by the other side to give his account of the
matter. Any other rule would subject the lawyer to any
kind of scurrilous and unjust attack and convert the [privilege] from being a mere shield into a weapon of offense."
The court in Bierman v. Marcus9 specifically stated that in
deciding whether a party had waived the attorney-client
privilege, "the most important consideration is
fairness.""°
I.

ATTORNEY'S ADVICE ATACKED

The inequity involved in hiding behind the privilege is
most obvious in cases where the client attacks an attorney's actions. In Kelly v. Cummens," an attorney represented a defendant charged with the sale of liquor to a
minor. The lawyer won postponements and continuances
as often and as long as possible, but the case eventually
See infra notes 33-54 and accompanying text.
8 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1217 at 638 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
7 121 N.W. 540 (Iowa 1909).
This sword/shield analogy is frequently used by courts considering
8 Id.
waiver issues. See ITT Corp. v. United Tel. Co., 60 F.R.D. 177, 185 (M.D. Fla.
1973); Independent Prod. Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 22 F.R.D. 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1958)
(first amendment privileges); Bradshaw v. Iowa Methodist Hosp., 253 Iowa 360,
115 N.W.2d 816 (1962) (physician-patient privilege); Koump v. Smith, 25 N.Y.2d
869, 250 N.E. 2d 857 (1969) (physician-patient privilege); WEINSTEIN ON EvIDENCE . 511-17. Cf San Francisco v. Super. Ct., 37 Cal. 2d 227, 231 P.2d 26
(1951) (en banc) ("He cannot have his cake and eat it too.")
9 122 F. Supp. 250 (D.N.J. 1954) (party asserting privilege in objection to depostion question).
,oId. at 252.
it 143 Iowa 152, 121 N.W. 540 (1909).
6
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went to trial. 2 At that time the defendant told the attorney to let the plaintiff take a judgment against him, that
"he had his property fixed so that the judgment would not
harm him."' 3 When the defendant later changed his mind
and moved for a new trial, the court permitted the attorney to testify regarding his transactions with his client. By
attacking the attorney, the court held, the client had
waived the privilege. 14
The client in Farnsworth v. Sanford'5 also criticized his
attorney's advice. Farnsworth, the client, attempted to
withdraw a guilty plea by alleging that his lawyers had exerted undue pressure on him. The court therefore allowed the attorneys to testify as to what they had done
and said in a conference about the guilty pleas. The court
asserted that: "a client [who] charges his counsel with
misconduct.

. .

has no right to be free of contradiction in

testifying about the misconduct." The court found that
by
the client "waives the privilege of the communication
' 6
himself making it an issue to be tried.'
A defendant's claim that his attorney forced him to testify can also bring about a waiver of privilege. In Tasby v.
United States, 17 Tasby alleged that his lawyer had rendered
ineffective assistance of counsel in his advice regarding
whether Tasby should testify. The trial court permitted
the attorney to testify as to his actual advice given to
Tasby. " The appellate court upheld this decision:
Surely a client is not free to make various allegations of
misconduct and incompetence while the attorney's lips are

sealed by invocation of the attorney-client privilege. Such
an incongruous result would be inconsistent with the ob2

Id. at 541.

13 Id.

,4 Id. at 542 (waiver required "in the interest of truth and justice").
is 115 F.2d 375 (5th Cir. 1940).

16Id. at 377. See also Roberts v. Greenway, 233 Ga. 473, 476, 211 S.E.2d 764,
767 (1975) ("A petitioner for habeas corpus relief cannot allege that he was deprived of his constitutional rights and then invoke the shield of the attorney-client
privilege to prevent an accurate determination of the merit of his claim").
,7 504 F.2d 332 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1125 (1975).
,8 Id. at 335 (trial attorney's testimony set out at length).
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ject and purpose of the attorney-client privilege and a patent perversion of the rule.19
The most vehement denunciation of attempts to assert
the privilege while attacking the attorney's advice comes
from the Fifth Circuit. In United States v. Woodall,20 the defendant asserted that his guilty pleas were invalid since he
lacked knowledge of the sentence consequences of the
pleas. Woodall's objections to his attorney's testimony
were overruled:
Courts earnestly pursuing reality would be hard put to
justify a rule that would allow a defendant circumstanced
as Woodall here to assert that his solemn pleas of guilty
were negated for lack of accurate information of sentence
consequences, then permit him to run a procedural trap
play that would block the development of the plain truth
which shows his own attorney told him exactly what he
could expect. Not only does this specious sophistry fail to
protect confidential relationships, it trifles with the truthit scoffs at justice- and we reject it flatly.2 '
An attack on the attorney's advice makes that advice-relevant to the issues in the lawsuit. This relevance waives
the privilege and makes the information discoverable and
admissible.
II.

RELIANCE UPON ATrORNEY's ADVICE

Waiver also occurs when the client relies on the attorney's advice, not just when she attacks it. In cases in
which the client relies on the attorney's advice, rather
than attacking it, the focus shifts from fairness to the attorney to fairness to the opposing litigant. Where a party
asserts reliance on advice of counsel as a defense, the attorney's advice again becomes relevant. The other party
is therefore entitled to probe that attorney's advice.
This situation frequently arises in securities cases. In
,9 Id. at 336.
438 F.2d 1317 (5th Cir. en banc), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 933 (1971).
21 Id. at 1326.
2o
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Panter v. Marshall Field & Co.,22 Carter Hawley Hale
(CHH) made a tender offer for the purchase of Marshall
Field. Marshall Field in turn resisted this offer, filing suit
against CHH alleging antitrust violations. CHH ultimately withdrew its bid to acquire Marshall Field. Following the aborted takeover, some Marshall Field
shareholders sued it for violations of the securities laws.23
Marshall Field, in its defense, relied heavily on the advice
of counsel as the basis for its opposition to the takeover,
but resisted any attempt to allow CHH to discover that
advice. The court held that "[w]here. . . a party asserts
as an essential element of his defense reliance upon the
advice of counsel, we believe the party waives the attorney-client privilege with respect to all communications. . . concerning the transactions for which counsel's
advice was sought. ' 24 Similarly, in Garfinkle v. Arcata National Corp. ,25 Arcata claimed that the alleged securities violations26 were based on the advice of counsel. This
defense waived Arcata's attorney-client privilege, since
"the privileged communication [was] injected as an issue
in the case by the party which enjoy[ed] its protection. "27
Antitrust suits can also give rise to explicit claims of reliance on counsel and hence to waivers of privilege. In
Handgards,Inc. v. Johnson &Johnson,28 one manufacturer of
disposable plastic gloves brought suit against another
such manufacturer claiming that the defendant brought a
series of patent infringement suits against it in bad faith as
a part of a conspiracy to restrain trade and monopolize
the industry. In its defense, the company sued intended
80 F.R.D. 718 (N.D. Il. 1978).
The plaintiffs alleged violations of 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1983) and breach of
fiduciary duty. Panter, 80 F.R.D. at 720.
22
23

24

Id. at 721.

64 F.R.D. 688 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
The violation alleged was failure to register stock. Id. at 720.
27 Id. at 689. See also Broad v. Rockwell International Corp., 1977 FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 95,894 (N.D. Tex. 1977); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hughes, 332
F.2d 602, 615 (2d Cir. 1964); cf. Smith v. Bentley, 9 F.R.D. 489 (S.D.N.Y. 1949)
(dispute regarding payment of royalties).
28 413 F. Supp. 926 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
25
26
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to call its patent attorneys as witnesses. The court held
that if it relied on their testimony, the company would
waive the attorney-client privilege as to the entire litigation files from the earlier suits:
By putting their lawyers on the witness stand in order to
demonstrate that the prior lawsuits were pursued on the
basis of competent legal advice and were, therefore,
brought in good faith, defendants will waive the attorneyclient privilege as to communications relating to the issue
of the good faith prosecution of the patent actions.29
Criminal cases also contain potential for issue-related
30
privilege waivers. The defendant in United States v. Miller
was charged with transporting goods known to have been
fraudulently obtained. He claimed in defense that he had
acted in good faith, based on the advice of his lawyer. In
so doing, he waived the attorney-client privilege.'
In short, specific reliance on advice of counsel makes
that advice an issue to be tried. Having put the advice in
issue, a party cannot hide behind the attorney-client privilege to conceal relevant facts. Explicit reliance on advice
of counsel will waive the privilege as to all advice on that
issue.
III.
A.

ATrORNEY'S ADVICE UNMENTIONED BUT RELEVANT

The Justificationfor Issue-Related Waivers

The findings of waiver in the above cases are natural
extentions of the cases finding waiver when the attorney's
advice is attacked. In both cases, the client himself
brought the privilege issue into the lawsuit by either attacking or relying on his attorney's advice. Courts will
take this logic one step further. Privilege may also be
waived when the privileged communications become releId. at 929.
600 F.2d 498 (5th Cir. 1979).
Id. at 501-02 (Miller's attorney had actually informed him that his project was
illegal).
29
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vant to an issue in the lawsuit without any explicit mention of them.
Such relevance generally arises when the substantive
law in question makes a party's state of mind relevant.
This can occur in a number of factual settings. A party
may make her state of mind relevant by pleading matters
explicitly involving her mental state such as duress, good
faith and bad faith. Attorney-client communications may
also become relevant even when the party's state of mind
is not specifically mentioned. This often happens in patent litigation when the meaning of a licensing agreement
or the validity or misuse of a patent is in issue. The communications may also become relevant in a fraud case; in
states where a plaintiff must prove subjective reliance on
defendant's representations,3 2 all of the information on
which the plaintiff acted, including advice of counsel, becomes relevant.
In these cases, the attorney's advice has not been relied
on nor has it been attacked. Instead, the client's motives
and knowledge of relevant facts are at the center of the
dispute. Attorney-client communications become important because they are relevant to the client's state of mind.
The communications are facts which, like other facts, tend
to show the basis for the client's actions.
Courts often invoke these relevancy waivers by analogy
to the physician-patient privilege. In cases where the patient places his physical condition in issue, he waives his
physician-patient privilege. Courts will find the privilege
to be waived in the interest of equity. "[Lilt would be unfair and inconsistent to permit the retention of the privilege" when the patient has voluntarily made his doctor's
testimony relevant.3 3 Courts have repeatedly found a
32 A plaintiff must prove subjective reliance upon the defendants representations in Iowa, for example. See Lockard v. Carson, 387 N.W.2d 871, 878 (Iowa
1980).
33 Lambdin v. Leopard, 251 N.E.2d 165, 167 (Ohio C. P. 1968) (personal injury

case). See also 8 WICMORE ON EVIDENCE 2389 (McNaughton rev. 1961) Wigmore

notes, for example, that waiver is required to prevent a party from saying:
I tender witnesses A, B and C, who will openly prove the severe na-
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waiver of the physician-patient privilege in personal injury
cases in which a party puts his physical condition in issue.3 4 The privilege can also be waived 35when a party's
mental capacity is relevant to the lawsuit.
The court in Hearn v. Rhay3 6 discussed at length the circumstances under which the attorney-client privilege is
waived when the communication between attorney and
client becomes relevant to an issue in the lawsuit. In
Hearn, a prisoner's rights suit, defendant jailers asserted
that they had acted in good faith. 7 Plaintiff sought to discover the legal advice that defendants received from the
state attorney regarding their treatment of prisoners. The
defendants claimed that this advice was privileged, but the
ture of my injury. But I object to the testimony of witness D, a physician called by the opponent to prove that my injury is not so severe
as I claim, because it is extremely repugnant to me that my neighbors should learn the nature of my injury.
Id.
4 See Collins v. Bair, 256 Ind. 230, 268 N.E.2d 95 (1971). Collins was a personal
injury suit in which plaintiff called a physician to testify in his behalf. This waived
his privilege as to other doctors treating the same condition. See also State ex rel.
McNutt v. Keet, 432 S.W.2d 597 (Mo. 1968)(en banc) (bringing personal injury
suit waives privilege when damages are in issue); Koump v. Smith, 25 N.Y. 2d 869,
873, 250 N.E.2d 857, 861 (1969)("A party should not be permitted to assert a
mental or physical condition in seeking damages or in seeking to absolve himself
from liability and at the same time assert the privilege in order to prevent the
other party from ascertaining the truth of the claim and the nature and extent of
the injury or condition.") Mattison v. Poulen, 134 Vt. 158, 353 A.2d 327
(1976)(bringing personal injury action waives privilege).
"5 See State v. Cole, 295 N.W.2d 29, 35 (Iowa 1980)(insanity); State v. Tensley,
249 N.W.2d 659 (Iowa 1977) (diminished capacity); State v. Berry, 324 So. 2d 822
(La. 1975)(insanity); Florida v. Axelson, 363 N.Y.S.2d 200 (N.Y.S. Ct. 1974) (insanity); Annot., 44 A.L.R.3d at 59-60, 104-115 (1972).
36 68 F.R.D. 574 (E.D. Wash. 1975).

31 Plaintiff alleged that he had been repeatedly confined in the mental health
unit without a hearing and that the mental health unit was in fact a euphemism for
punitive isolation. 68 F.R.D. at 577. Defendant jailers asserted good faith as a
defense. This defense has both subjective and objective requirements, because it
is not available if the defendant acted with either actual malice or in disregard of
clearly established constitutional rights. See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308
(1975). The Hearn court concluded that since legal advice received by defendants
is highly probative of whether they acted with malice, plaintiff was entitled to discover the advice to help in rebutting the good faith defense. This was true even
though defendants' good faith defense was not based on advice of counsel. 68
F.R.D. at 581-82, n.5.
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court found that any such privilege was waived by the
good faith defense. As a general rule waiver occurs when:
the party asserting the privilege placed information protected by it in issue through some affirmative act for his
own benefit, and to allow the privilege to protect against
disclosure of such information would have been manifestly
unfair to the opposing party. The factors common to each
exception may be summarized as follows: (1) assertion of
the privilege as a result of some affirmative act, such as
filing suit, by the asserting party; (2) through this affirmative act, the asserting party put the protected information
at issue by making it relevant to the case; and (3) application of the privilege would have denied the opposing party
access to information vital to his defense. Thus, where
these three conditions exist, a court should find that the
party asserting a privilege has impliedly waived it through
his own affirmative conduct.38
When a litigant takes some affirmative action which
makes her state of mind relevant, she may waive the attorney-client privilege in the interest of fairness to the opposing party. This may happen in any kind of case. It is
most likely to occur, however, in certain kinds of cases.
These are issues of intent, duress, estoppel, fraud, and
good faith. 9 In each of these areas, substantive law
makes a party's motives important.40 Where advice from
an attorney may be part of that motivation, it becomes relevant, discoverable, and admissible.
B.

Examples of Issue-Related Waivers

A landmark case finding an issue-related waiver of the
attorney-client privilege isJack Winter, Inc. v. Koratron Co.4
In that case, Koratron attempted to evade the provisions
38 Id. at 581. See also Haymes v. Smith, 73 F.R.D. 572 (W.D.N.Y. 1976)(action
asserting right of inmates to organize for collective action).
39 See infra notes 41-54 and accompanying text.
40 In good faith cases, for example, motivation is an important factor in the
issue of malice. See supra note 37. In fraud cases, the plaintiff may need to prove
subjective reliance on the defendant's representations. See supra note 32.
4 50 F.R.D. 225 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
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of an agreement by alleging that it had executed the
agreement under duress. In making this claim, Koratron
waived its privilege as to its attorney's advice regarding
the agreement:
[T]he content of statements by White [the attorney] to officers of Koratron with respect to the .. .[a]greement
have clearly been placed in issue by Koratron's claim that
the agreement was made under duress. Such a claim necessarily raises the issues of whether any advice was given
as to the agreement, what the content of that advice was,
the competence of the advice, and whether such advice
was in fact relied upon by Koratron when it entered into
the agreement.42
Thus, although Koratron never mentioned its attorney's
advice and in fact denied the impact of such advice on its
actions, the court allowed opposing counsel to discover
the attorney-client communications in order to test Koratron's claim of duress.43
Matters arising in patent suits often place otherwise
privileged communications in issue. For example, courts
often find a waiver when the validity of the patent is relevant. 44 Patent licensing disputes have also made attorneyclient communications discoverable. In Pitney-Bowes Inc. v.
Mestre,45 Pitney-Bowes (P-B) filed suit alleging that P-B
had intended to enter into modifications of patent licensing agreements. The court held that this made intent an
issue and that P-B had thereby waived its attorney-client
privilege. "P-B has placed in issue the very soul of this
litigation-the intent of the parties with regard to con42 Id.

at 229.

Id.

4.1

44 Honeywell, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 50 F.R.D. 117 (M.D. Pa. 1970)(patent
infringement suit)("when a plaintiff in a patent infringement suit has put the validity of the patents directly in issue, he may have waived any claim of privilege.");

United States Industries,
But see Burlington Indus.
infringement suit) ("This
nities merely by bringing
issue.")
4.

Inc. v. Norton Co., 174 U.S.P.Q. 514 (N.D.N.Y. 1972);
v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26, 35 (D. Md. 1974)(Patent
court does not find that plaintiff has waived these immua suit which places patent validity and enforceability in

86 F.R.D. 444 (S.D. Cal. 1980).
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Issues concerning the tolling of limitations statutes
have also created waivers of attorney-client privilege. In
Russell v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc. ,'47 defendants alleged that plaintiffs' claims were barred by failure to file
an administrative complaint within the time period applicable under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA); 48 plaintiffs responded that defendants' actions
had caused the delay, thus tolling the deadline. The court
held that the plaintiffs' assertion waived the privilege, and
defendants could discover any advice regarding filing suit
that the plaintiffs had received from their attorneys. The
court believed that "[t]o protect against disclosure of such
information would be manifestly unfair to the
49
defendants."
Raising an estoppel claim can also cause a waiver of attorney-client privilege. In Connell v. Bernstein-Macaulay,
Inc., the court held that a party claiming estoppel had to
reveal its attorney's advice. The court reached this conclusion because the party was trying to avoid a statutory
provision created for the benefit of its adversary by a
claim of estoppel. The court further found it likely that
invasion of the attorney-client privilege would shed light
on the estoppel claim. 5 '
46 Id. at 447. See also International Paper Co. v. Fibreboard Corp., 63 F.R.D. 88
(D.Del. 1974); Gorzegno v. Maguire, 62 F.R.D. 617 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)(By introducing a previous patent application as proof of plaintiff's knowledge of the information, defendants waived their right to claim privilege regarding the background of
the application).
47

493 F. Supp. 456 (S.D. Tex. 1980).

48The Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1976), prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of the employee's age. Under the
act, an employee who believes that her rights have been violated must file a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission within 180 days of
the date of the violation (absent an applicable state statute) or she will forfeit her
right to bring a lawsuit based on that violation. This time period can be tolled,
however, if the employee delays filing because of the actions of the employer.
4,j493

F. Supp. at 458.
50 407 F. Supp. 420 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).

51Before compelling disclosure, the Connell court required plaintiff to show a
"good faith basis to believe" that the privileged material would be relevant to the
estoppel issue. See also Hearn v. Rhay, 68 F.R.D. 574, 582 (E.D. Wash. 1975)("A
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Waivers based on relevance can also arise in other factual circumstances. In suits against insurers for bad faith
failure to settle, the theory of the lawsuit places in issue
the conduct and state of mind of plaintiff's personal injury
attorney in failing to propose a settlement.52 In suits
where plaintiff alleges fraud and must prove subjective reliance, his attorney's advice may also be relevant and the
privilege thus waived.53
In none of these cases did the party asserting attorneyclient privilege specifically allude to advice of counsel,
either by attacking or relying on the advice given. Rather,
substantive law created the possibility that the attorney's
advice was relevant to the issue at hand. To prevent unfairness to the opposing party, the courts held the privilege to be waived.54
IV.

CONCLUSION

Attorneys should be ever mindful of the possibility that
otherwise privileged documents and conversations may
become accessible during the process of litigation.
Whether seeking or resisting discovery, lawyers must be
substantial showing of merit to plaintiff's case must be made before a court should
apply the exception to the attorney-client privilege defined herein.")
11 See, e.g., Merritt v. Superior Court, 88 Cal. Rptr. 337 (Cal. App. 1970). See
also Scotstown Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Diplomatic Marine, Inc., No. 77 Civ. 5386
(MEL) (S.D.N.Y. March 5, 1980)(suit for indemnity in which defendants tried to
discover the basis for plaintiff's settlement of its earlier case, including advice of
counsel).
5 Sedco International, S.A. v. Cory, 683 F.2d 1201 (8th Cir. 1982). (The plaintiff sued SEDCO for fraudulently inducing him into a Persian Gulf oil deal.
SEDCO alleged that the plaintiff in fact relied on his own investigations and on his
attorney's advice. The court held that, by asserting fraud, the plaintiff waived his
right to assert a privilege to prevent disclosure of communications that might
have proven he did not rely on SEDCO or that such reliance was unreasonable).
- Where the issue is work product protection rather than attorney-client privilege, the results are the same. The relevance of the attorney's advice meets the
substantial need/good cause requirement and overcomes the work product barrier. See American Standard, Inc. v. Bendix Corp., 80 F.R.D. 706 (W.D. Mo.
1978); Bird v. Penn Central Co., 61 F.R.D. 43 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Bourget v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 48 F.R.D. 29 (D. Conn. 1969); Kirkland v. Morton Salt
Co., 46 F.R.D. 28 (N.D. Ga. 1968); Shapiro v. Allstate Ins. Co., 44 F.R.D. 429,
430-31 (E.D. Pa. 1968); McCullough Tool Co. v. Pan Geo Atlas Corp., 40 F.R.D.
26.64[4] at 26-389.
490, 494 (S.D. Tex. 1966); 4 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE
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aware that the legal relevance of attorney advice may
make continued assertion of the privilege unsupportable.
Courts, moved by considerations of fairness, may find that
the privilege has been waived. A party should therefore
carefully consider the issues that it wishes to raise, and
one who affirmatively puts protected information at issue
in a lawsuit should prepare to find that information in the
hands of opposing counsel.

